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'EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The airline industry has been challenged, during the last years, by the opening of the 
European  market,  th~·  adjustments . required  to  deal  with  .the  new  competitive· 
environment and the pressure of the US  open skies strategy. The aim of the present 
communication is  first  to  assess the progress which has been made and second-to 
identify ~he initiatives which can contribute to  the.co~petitiveness of  the industry. 
•  European  airlines  have  developed  i~ovative ·  st~ategi~s  in, order  to  adapt 
themselves to market growth and competition challenges.- During the  ~ast decade· 
they have achieved considerable productivity improvements which now permit's 
the sector to  create new jobs. However they still  suffer. from relative structural 
. fragmentation and financialfragility when compared. to their. main co:tnpetitors, . 
. notably North-American carriers.·  .  ·  ·  .. 
.  • ' . .  ~. '' : 
•  Liberalisation  and  globalisation ·make the market increasingly· competitive and 
require  airlines  to  undertake  large  restructuring.  efforts.:. The  Commission 
authorised state aid' as a' one-off measure. 'to  help o.ati<mai 'c;:arri'ers ,to  restructure 
during the transition to the liberalised single market. Thts  transitio~ .is now ov'er· .. 
•  . The airline industry .s~ffers from, the same h~dicap  as oth~r industnes in ,Europe, . 
'  "  ''  '  '  '  '  '  '  1.·  '  '  "  ' 
justifying·  general  .  initiatives  enhancing  the ·.efficiency  . of  the  eCOJ10tTiiC· 
environp1ent1.  The· present communication  identifie's·  those· deficiencies  of the 
· regulatory  framework. of. air  transport  activities,  which. ..  · stand  in  the· way  of 
adjustment by European companies. To help the in'dustry towards this  strat~gy, 
the European Commission identifies the following policy orientation:  . 
'  '  ' 
The CommiSsion uses ail'the tools at its disposafto ensu.te:iiltegr~tion of 
the European' market. This includes the' applicatiqn' of  EC cpnipetltio~ law 
to prevent attempts tore-fragment the market through public interVention 
or  anti-comp~titive alliances or' mergers.· The· monitoring' of public  and 
private  behaviour;  the 'transparency .of  C~lnmuni(y legislation: arid ·the 
definition, and dissemination of  best practices, on a number of  issues-such 
as Public Service.Obligations, are important elements in this regard. 
The elimination oftechnical obstacles to  trade~ in particular. by· faster and 
more  efficient. harmonisation of safety  rules  through  the  creation ·of a 
European  Aviation  Safety Authority  and  by  giving  impetus  to  ICAO. 
activities in  the enviro:innent field will help-the industry. 
1  The  Competitiveness  of European  Industry  - 1998  Report  (Office  for  Official  Publications  of the 
European Communities C0-17-98-556-EN-C) 
3 
':· -··  The .fragmentation of the internal market ·results also from  the lack of an 
·  ~  e~ternal dimension. Ownership rules and the bilateral agreements systen1 
create  obstacles  to  industry  restructurjng  at  European  level  and  to  fair 
coni.petitioi1 with the open skies  ~ountries. These economic consequences 
add tb  legal:justificatio~s for a ·genuine externai dimension permitting to 
·insert the alliance·s within a fair European framework. 
/ 
o  · The  present  inefficiencies  of the  mark~t and  the· sensitivity  of the  sector  to 
economic cycles and external shocks lead the Commission to develop its. function. 
as  an observatory of the European air transport industry.  For this purpose it  is 
carrying'out·a long tenn project for. the creation cif a comprehensive database of 
. the European airli!]e  industry. This  will increase the quality and  availability of 
data  and·  analyses  on·  capacity,  traffic, ·financial  performance, ·productivity, 
· industry  and .route ·structure,  airports, and employment  that  are. necessary  io 
· support  a ·policy  aiming  t,lt  safeguarding  the  competitiveness  of the  industry. 
~:  I~fonnati<;m and_· analyses  on  indus~ry trends  will  be  available  to .the  general 
public on· the Commission's internet site. This tool will enable the Commission 
·to monitor the evolution of theindustryin general and of air fares in particular, 
:, focusing on routes and airports that give  ri~e to  prima facie excessive operating 
ratios. 
•·  This communication  will J'e the1 subject  of discussions that the  Commission 
.. _.:-.intends to hold withtheindustry, Iiationalregulators and users.  · ·- · 
..  ~  '•: 
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1. THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Air transport is a high growth industry, but cyclical and with uncertain profi.tability 
1. ·  Ov~r the  past  half century  civil· .aviation  has· developed  into· a  global industry 
.  generating high added value. If has becom~ the primary mode for international and . 
·.intercontinental mass transport of passengers and high-value cargo  ..  Today, it is  a 
· growth industry characterised by direct and .indirect job creation. Air transport is  a 
highly cyclical industry, because of its  str~ng correlation to ·the economic cycle. A 
·wide set c;>f factors determines the .demand for air  tr~sport. This includes  .  .income, I 
price, many country/region specific features such as population size and growth rate, 
availability . of  alternative  transport  modes,  migration . flows·. and  cultural . and 
'  .  - . 
historical attitudes  . 
.. . However, economic groWth is the main driving force:  an increase in GDP ustmlly 
· entails a more th~m proportional increase in traffic, and conversely demand is very 
sensitive to recessions.  With income elasticity of demand for air,.transport ibeing 
'high2,  fll,lctuations 'in the economy·result in 'even wider  fluctuation~ in the aviation 
''  •  '  •  •  •  1- •  ••·•  '  '  ,,  •• 
industry. 
I'  2:~  In  recent  years 'air  transport  record~d  .. a. strong  growth  in  the' volume  of outp'ut 
produced and sold.  After the· crisis at the beginning of. the decade, when the joint · 
impact. of the worid recession and the  gulf war resulted  in a tangible. decline  in 
demand, the air transport. industry has been growing  at a sustained pace,· bqth at  ·. 
Wqrld and European level. According to  ICAO.data, passenger traffic in terms of 
.passenger-kilometres performed ro.s.e by 7% in 1997 over 1996  .. The year l997 was 
one '9f great expansion ·for the :major· European airlines as well: available statistics 
.... ,gh.ow. that AEA member ·airlines: traffic  (revenue ton kilometres RTK) inc~eased  .by 
·9:~7%; capacity  (available  seat  kilometres ASK) by 6.7%;  and  freight  traffic  by 
5.31l(o.  More recent data tell us that the trend is continuing in 1998. The evolution of 
..  the :industry. in the. EU,  summarised in figure  l, shows the .evolution in the ASK 
performed by  the European·carriers on the intra"EU routes.  . 
.  ~  . 
2 Income elasticity of demand for air travel is the ratio between the percentage change rit demand and the 
percentage  change  in  inco~e: income. elasticity  =  %change  in  demandl%change  in  income.  For 
instance, a 2,% increase in income generating a 6% increase in air travel demand means that income 
· elasticity is  3. The availahle empirical evidence shows that income elasticity usually varies between 
1.5  and  2.5  depending on the  type of passenger (lower for  business passengers, ·higher for  leisure 
·passengers).  '-- ·  · 
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J. ·  ]'he .outlook for aviation is.difficult to predict. According to the latest market studies 
carried out by-t_he  major aircraft manufacturers, world-wide  deman~ for  air travel 
will  continue to .grow strongly in the next two  de~ades, at a rate of  ab~ut 5%  per 
year. ·However, this· forecast should be adjusted to  take into ·account major events 
th~t cannot be anticipated.  The recent ·financial· and economic crisis in south-east 
A_sia  is~ a  typical example of unforeseen factors  negatively affecting the industry. · 
· Indee9 the slump immediately resulted in some increased air tninsport overcapacity 
on roi.ttes to and from Asia, which might spread, to some extent, to other markets  .. 
4.  Air ._travel·. will  not  grow  homogeneously  ac~oss  the  world  but .  vary  from· a 
geographical area to another. In sorrie areas air transport is already a mature industry 
and growth will be therefore moderate: this is the case of the. us domestic market 
.and more generally North America1 for which a yearly growth rate of 2% to 3% in 
· the  period .1996-2006  is  forecast.  Until recently growth was expected to  be very 
large in Asian markets (7% to 9% yearly .increase)  ~)ut the fi?ancial and economic 
crisis. currently, hitting  the region  suggests  that  more  cautious  figures  sh.ould  be 
contempla~ed·. Even in their most recent market studies, aircraft manufaCturers still 
retain an optimistic forecast in the medium-long term for Asia, As regards Europe, 
figures will be less spectacular than for  Asia but still higher than for the us. 
3 The  graph depicts  the  evolution of Available Seat Kilometres (ASK) produced within the  EU  by the 
Conununity ·airlines  belonging  to  AEA  (Association  of European  Airlines,  grouping  mainly .  flag. 
ca~iers) and ERA (Europeal) regional Airlines).  To make the picture complete one should add  ~e 
. figures concerning· charter airlines. Unfortunately statistic data available for this important segment of 
the market is scarce and poorly detailed.  However it,is estimated (Civil Aviation Authority CAP 685 
-The single Europein Aviation Market) that in  1996 the European charter aifliries carried 71 million 
passengers, which compares with the estimated scheduled total of around 240 million.  In terms of 
RPK the charter share is  higher, since on average the passenger distance is  longer f9r charter service 
than for scheduled service. The charter industry share would be· about 50% of  the total. 
6 5.  Opinions differ on the prospects for the next few  years but, taking into account the 
economic difficulties in-the Far East and the lrigh financial commitments stemming 
from  large aircraft purchases, it-cannot be excluded that a less favourable period lies 
ahead.  Generally  speaking,  there  is  a  rather  widespread  feeling  that  the  cycle  is  . 
reaching. its peak in 1998-99, and that a downturn may follow. 
Like their demand, airlines' profitability is very cyclical.  It depends on an airline's 
ability to  manage 'costs,  fares  and  load  factors  in  order to  adjust to  the  changing 
conditions of the market.  In recent  years  financial·-performance  has,  on  average, 
been good, but historical evidence shows that profits are thin and volatile and  the 
outlook of  individual airlines is no.t secure. 
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The  performance  of the  European  a~r  transport .  industry  from  a  world-wide 
perspective 
6.  The European air transport industry is relatively small compared· to  its competitors 
in North America. If  one looks at some key figures for the 10 largest airlines in the 
US,  the  EU  and  Asia-Oceania,  it js easy  to  grasp  the  difference.  In  1996  these 
European airlines transported about 192  million of passengers, just as many as the · 
Asians, against a figure of 510 million for the American carriers. The difference in  . 
size is even wider when considering the Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK), an 
indicator that combines the nurflber of  passengers and the distance over which they 
are  transported.  The  different  scale  is  confirmed  ~y the  figures  concerning 
employment, and fleet size and revenue, as presented in the table below: 
Top ten airlines in US, EU and Asia-Oceania- 1997 
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Source: Airline Business 
PASSENGERS  RPK  REVENUE  EMPLOYEES  FLEET 
(MilLIONS)  .(MILLIONS)  (M $) 
us  524.12  900 066  86 249  461  852  . 3 529 
EU  . 212.68  446 677  63 203  p5 580  1 430 
ASIA-OCEANIA  199.08  412 130  46 879  195 360  1 051 
. 
/ 
The largest European airlines are similar in size to the largest American ones but a 
typical characteristic of the European- airline industry is the existen'ce of a second 
layer of relatively small airlines with a global yocation. This may partly explain the· 
limited profitability of the  European industry,  since in the global  airline  industry 
size  is  an  important  efficiency ·factor.  After  years  of  fii].ancial. difficulties  most 
. European airlines recorded positive results in 1996 and 1997, but they are still more 
vulnerable than their competitors; Indeed in the period 1996-97 the top 10 European 
Airlines· performed an average net margin (i.e. the ratio net re:sult/revenue) of 1.4%, 
against values of  3.8% for US airlines and 2.4% f()r Asia-Oceania. 
4,00% 
3;00% 
.2.00% 
1,00% 
0,00% 
Average net margin of  top 10 airlines in US, BJ and Asia.Qc:eania; 1996-97 
(source: Air1ine Business) 
. us  EU  ·Asia-Oceania 
Structure of the industry 
.  .  .  .  , 
7.  The opening up of a market previously protected from competition usually results in 
a first phase in which the number of pa.Iticipants in the industry increases. This is 
.  followed by a second phase of  consolidation whereby the number of firms decreases 
and their size increases. Air transport seems to  have followed this· process in  the 
USA.  Europe, which .undertoo~ liberalisat_ion some ten years later, still seems to be 
8 in the first phase4. In 1993 we bad  132 llirlines performing commercially significant 
. sd~eduled operations; in  1998 we have 164.  .. 
When  comparing the air transport  market  in  the  EU  and  the  USA  one  should  be 
aware  of some  important  structural  differences.  For  instance  in  Europe  average 
distances  between  cities  are  shorter  and  competition  from  alternative  transport 
modes, notably road and railways, is much stronger than in the US. Of course these 
aspects explain to some extent the different structure, yet it is striking that Europe, 
whose domestic _market is less than one third of North America's, has a far higher 
number of airlines  operating  large  aircraft,  90  against  37.  Conversely  European 
carriers' average size is much smaller, both in terms of number of aircraft operated 
(average fleet of 27 against 111) and market shares. The following table shows the 
extent to which the European industry is fragmented. 
Domestic market  N° airlines  - Fleet 
% of  world RPK 
EUROPE (geographical)  7.76%  90  2445 
NORTH AMERICA  24.41%.  37  4122 
Source: CommiSSion's elaboratton on the "Atrbus Global Market Forecast 1998", covenng atrhnes 
accounting for 98% of the cu~ent  global ~ctive· fleet. of  passengers aircraft with 70 seats and more. 
8.  A major aspect of structural' change· i~ the emergence of  new operating patterns for 
airlines. 
In hub-and-:-spoke operations traffic is concentrated into a single, centrally located . 
destination (the hub) which is used as a connecting point for passengers travelling 
between any other'pair ofdestinations in the network.  By reducing the number of 
direct routes, traffic flows  are condensed, permitting the use of larger aircraft and 
the operation at higher load factors. This pattern is now followed by major carriers. 
Some airlines pursue low-cost  no-frills  strategies. This alternative  concept of air 
transport consists of serving dens~ and short haul markets on a point-t~-point basis 
with  frequent  service.  Dramatic  reductions  of costs . are  achieved  through  a 
revolutionary  product. planning based on  features  such  as  no  interlining,  no  pre-
assigned  seat selection,  no  in-flight  food,  single  class ·of service,  use of cheap, 
uncongested  secondary  airports  and  uniform  fleets  of young  and  fuel-efficient 
aircraft  .. Low~cost  airlines are estimated to have carried about 7-8 million passengers· 
·in 1997. Hub and spoke and low cost are the main emerging tendencies but they are 
not mutually exclusive. Other airlines follow patt_erns that are a combination of the 
two. 
4 See annex 1 fig.  1, p.21 
9 .. . 
9.  The  unending  pressure  for  cost . reduction .. and  efficiency  gain  has- yielded 
considerable productivity  increases~ This can be appreciated when considering two · 
major  indicators  fqr  productivity,  output  per  employee,  which  is  measured  as 
RTK/staff, and operating costs per unit of  outpu~, expressed ~s co~t/ATK._  . 
. Indeed  in  the  period  1990  to  1996  the  1  0 largest-European  airlines  recorded on 
average  a 53%  increase in RTK/staff,  while their cost/ATK went down by  13%. 
Although this is a significant improvement, productivity of the 10 largest American 
airlines is still higher, meaning that restructuring efforts need to be c~ntinued.  . 
Productivity 1996 - EU versus USA· 
Source: Europea'n Commission and US Departmen(  of transportation 
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. Social impact of  current trends 
The Commission assessed the social· impact brought about by the evolution of the 
industry, and  reached an encouraging conclusion: employment during the  years of 
implementation  of the  liberalisation  measures,  far  from  being. undermined, ·has 
actually increased.  Between 1988-1996 the overall number of employees in civi I 
aviation increased from 435,400 to 489,700 and the .outlook for employment in this 
sector is positive, although the trend is not homogeneous across tim~, EU Member 
States. and different  parts of the industry  ..  For in.stance-,  thy  level  qf employment 
decreased until  1994 and  incre~ed since then;  it stagnated for flag  carriers whil~  .. 
increased· for other airlines, although flag_ carriers still represent 80%. of  jobs in the  ' 
airline industry and over half (57.5%) of  the entire civil aviation sector.. The results 
of  the assessment or'  the social impact are presented in detail in annex 2. 
The.  emphasis  on· competiti~eness · hai  brought  about  more ·flexible  forins  of· 
employment. This occurred particularly· with state-.owned airlines, whicl) accourit_ed 
for 67% 6fali airline emplo0nent in·1988 (apart from British Air\.vays, .'which was · 
already privatised).  It  is  also noticeable  tha~ conditions of employment  hav~ been 
modified  for  newly  hired  employees,  mariy  of whom  are  granted  fi'xeQ  term 
co'ntr~cts and to whom, in many cases;tw'o-tier pay·systt::~s .are applied. ·n must be  , , 
stressed  that  this  trend  is  not  specific  to  the  air.  transport  industry ,arid· dm be 
observed in other sectors of  activity where~ liberalisation process has been'initiated 
or whete COnlpetition is. having'· a significant impact However, job security·  ~emaiils 
rehitively strong at flag carriers for longer serVice· employees. The level of  wages· is 
_still-higher (from 15% to 25% in most cases) than at smaller airlines for similar jobs. 
Performance related pay schemes tend to replace ·seniority pay schemes for some 
categoric~ of employees; this move is hot only evident in the civil aviation sector 
but is a  more general trend of  employment today. 
· .. ' 
:  .  ~.  : 
1'1 
.. 
'  .·~ 
:) 
·• 
' 
' 
{ 
-~· 2. THE NEED FOR PERMANENT RESTRUCTURING 
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10.  Airlines are facing  increasingly complex situations. Notably, ongoing demand  for 
improved products iq terms  0~  mqre  destination~) and more frequencies,  requires in 
tum the ability to  innovate and- greater financial  resources. The task is  even  more 
. challenging for  Europe,  which, despite recent progress, is  still  la!ming behind the 
major·  inteinatipnal,  in  particular -US,  competitors  because. of  the  structurai 
weaknesses described earlier. If European  ~i~lines ~e  to  survi~e  and flourish in. this 
increasingly  competitive  environment,  permanent  restructuring,  that  is  ongoing · 
-- improvements in efficiency and competitiveness, is necessary. Much of  the  incr~ase 
il)· competition  has  come  from  the  EU  liberalisation  measures  in  the,  industry: 
However it should be noted that this. process has not introduced competition on  all 
markets. The Commission's own)  996 report on the impact of the third package of 
liberalisation measures noted that 64% of  EC routes were operated as monopolies, 
although many of  these are new or thin routes, and that fares for business passengers 
had not decreased. 
1  1.  Restructuring- requires  that improvements .  are  achieved in· several  areas:  external 
environment,. company  level,  industry  level.  Competitiveness  is  enhanced .both 
through  improvements  of  the  airlines'  performances  and· the  economic  and 
regulatory · environment  surrounding  the  airlines:  This  continuous · drive  for 
-efficiency-may take various  forms;·. -from- the_ development of innovative concepts 
such as  low-cost point- to point services or hub-and-spoke and global netWorks  to 
consolidation and rationalisatiori.through mergers and alliances.  · 
Improving the exten1al environment 
12 .  .In- its. l994. Communication "The way forward  for  civil aviation  in:  Europe" the 
_  Commission identified scarcity and cost of  infrastructure as a main .cause of  the high 
. costs incurred- by European air travellers. To improve this situation, the Commission 
has, in recent years, been carrying out initiatives targeting infrastructure.  · 
-·As of January  1999  access  to/ ground  handiing  market· for  third  parties  aL 
-Community .  airports  is  liberalised,  as  provided  for _by  Directive  96/67.  This _ 
·measure is  expected to  help reduce operating costs and improve-the quality of 
service  for  airport  users  .. The same ··kind  of effect is  expected to be  achieved 
· through .a new directive on- airport charges, which is now in the process of  being · 
adopted. 
•  '  ~  ·~c  ' 
- The fragmentation of  the air:traffic management systems is addressed through the 
: strengthening  of the  Eu.rocontrol  organisation:  F:oi:  this purpos:::,  a  revised 
· /-Eurocontrol Convention has been signed in 1997 and negoiiations haVe started in 
. order to allow  the full membership of  the Community in this organisation. · 
-- -"As  far as  safety is concerned, the Community is actively taking part in creating  ·  . 
. the  European  Air Safety Authority (EASA),  whose main objective will  be  to 
establish a high uniform level of aviation  safety in Europe. 
Because.  of acoustic  1:111d  air  pollution, ·air  transport  is  also  concerned by 
:  subst~tial environmental  regulation.  In  particular  the_  strong _growth  of .  air 
_·  -12 transport will necessitate actio~ on the C02  emissions of this sector in the future 
and  rules  on  noise  need  to.  be  updated  to  reflect  technical  progress.  The 
Commission  will  reflect  on  the  issue  of environmental  protection  and  its 
interaction with aviation competitiveness. 
Continuing restr·u~turing at company level 
13.  At  the  beginning  of the  1990s, · a  number  of airlines  experienced  situations  of 
financial and commercial crisis.· The causes were overcapaCity, lack·ofproductivity, 
high  costs  and  undercapitalisation,  made  worse  by  the  downtl,im  in·  demand. 
Restructuring  of ailing  airlines .  relied  to  a  large  extent on  state  funding.  The 
Commission  acted  to  make  these  restructuring  operations  consistent  with 
Community rules on State aiq.  Its objective was to create.  a level playing field for 
competition while accepting that some airlines carrying the financial burden of the 
past inust have the chance for a fresh start within the. framework ·of a reorganisation . 
programme, provided that this does not adversely affect·the situatio~ of  coillpetito'rs. 
.  ' 
In  1994 the Commission set out principles and criteria for  the assessment of state  .  '\  .  ' 
aid to airlines in  the guidelines on the application of  artiCles 87 and 88 of the  EC 
Treaty (Ex articles 92 and 93 of  the Treaty) and article 61  of the EEA, agreement to 
state .aid  in  the  aviation  sector.  The ·guidelines,  and  ..  an  analysis·· of. their 
implementation, are presented in annex 3. 
I  ' 
Since 1991  seven airlines.have benefited from public capital injections v.'hich were 
considered state aid within the pl.eaning .  of.. art 8  7 'and .  granted exemption under. art 
87.3.C:. in a 'few other cases the Commission considered the .capital injection to be a 
commercial·financial transaction..  .  .  . . 
. .  .  )  .  .  .  .  . 
.  Characteristics of  restructuring programmes supported by State aid. · 
The seven airlines that received state aid  had different'  characteristics and problems, 
.. 'requiring specific solutions. However, several general features r'ecur in all or some 
of the  restructuring  programmes. The main  category of measures  is  about  cost 
red(.ction,  in particular ·labour and financ;ing  costs,  although·other operating costs 
·~re  also  ·addressed  by ;cthe ~ restructuring  plans.  Other  areas  of intervention  are 
organisation and management as well as product design and  ·marketing. 
As  far.: -'as  the  cost  of labo~ is  concerned,  the  most ·immediate  .. and  traditi,onal 
measures -are temporary wage cuts or freezes,  suspensions of  promotions and staff 
reductions, usually achieved without lay-offs but through early  retirement .s'chemes. 
Innovative solutions are two-tier pay systems; whereby new employees are hired at 
·lower salaries than existing ones, and redistribution of  free shares to employees as a 
compensation  for  the  voluntary  reduction  in  wages.  The  overall, cost  of labour 
-depends  not only on the  wage  levels  but also  on labour productivity,  hence  the 
considerab~~· and successful, effort undertaken by airlines in this area. 
Restructuring  programmes  usually  focus  on  fleets,  aiming  at  modernisation  and 
rationalisation. The number of  aircraft may be reduced so that costly overcapacity is 
eliminated, old aircraft are replaced by new ones which· are more cost-effective and 
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more suitable to  the- specific operating requirements of each airline.  Eventually the 
reducdon of the different types of aircraft making up  a fleet is pursued, since this 
allows  considerable  savings  in  t~rins of maintenance  costs  and  costs  rebted to 
·training of ground and cabin personnel. Further cost reduction is achieved through 
·the disposal of  assets, such as holdings in hotels, airports,. other airlines, which yield 
no strategic advantage to the core activity while consuming resources.  . 
.  . 
Redesigning the  overall business strategy is  another major area for  restructuring. 
The  airline  business  is  no  longer  a  protected producer p1arket  but  rather· a  very 
competitive  industry,  where  the  key  success  factor  is  the  ability  to  ·meet  the 
diversified demand of customers. 'fhis requires carriers to  adopt an  approach .free 
. from  government  interference and ·-based  on  more  advanced  marketing techniques 
and  enhancement  of  the  Set:ViCe  quality.  In  their  restructuring  effo,rts,  airlines 
undertake  to  remodel  the_  product  planning.· This  is  tlie  combination of.  various . 
product features· such as route networks, frequencies, type· ofaircraft; type of  seniice 
and fares..  · 
Results 
The n~structuring programmes have achieved  .. their  objectives to  an  extent which 
varies from  one airline to  another but, overall, can be regarded as- successful,  as 
shown by the  most commonly  used  indicators .  in  the  industry  (see  annex  3  for 
details).  Privatisation- ofthese  ~airlines, which  was  unthinkable  before  the  public. 
C',  capital injections, is  today a reasonable and feasible project, niainly dependef1t  on 
the political will of  the owners. 
I  4.  The  Commission  authorised .state  aid  as  a  one-off measure· to· help  airlines 
. restructure'  during  the  transition . of  the  industry  frot:n  a.  heavily  proteCted 
environment to a liberalised one. However, most airlines that _required restructuring 
have now completed this  proces~.  ·The transition is now to be C()nsidered  as  being 
· finished, and with it the need ·and justification for state aid measur~s: (see § 38 of  the 
guidelines on the application of  articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty and article .61 ·of 
~he EEA agreement to state aid in the aviation sector) 
Restructuring at industry levei 
15.  Further -restructuring remains. ·necessary in Europe because of the fragmented nature · 
of  the industry, but the fOCUS  is shifting from the COmpany level to the industry (,lS  a 
whole.  To  ensure  long  term  success  in  the  increasingly  globalised  air  transport 
market, European. airlines need to  develop into globally competitive· entities.  One· 
respqnse might be a process of  simplification and consolidation, although alternative 
· · strategies such as concentrating,on niche market are also 1:ivailable.  Some signs that 
such a process has started are already visible: for instance the relahonshtp between 
flag  carriers  and  regional  airlines  is  moving  beyond  the  simpl'i!  practice . of 
commercial  agreements  towards  more  advan<_;ed  forms  of  inte~ation  such  as 
· franchising  or  direct .  controt  ttirough  acquisition.· Most  large  airlines  are  now 
engaged' in  a  process  of developing links  essentially  for  the  marketing  of 'their 
products~ in ,order to  create revenue berjefits  thiough  co-operation.  This  prt)cess 
should deepen eventually towards larger' cost savings by means of  fleet, network and 
staff integration. 
14 ','' 
Global strategic alliances 
Airlines have been making commercial agreements oflimited ·s'cope and duration for_ 
a· long  time,  but it  is  only  in  recent years that  stra,tegic  alliance!;i  have become a 
feature ofthe industry. A global alliarice can be seen as a family of  networks usually 
mad~ up  of one or more of the main  airlines  from  each of the  North  American, 
European and Asiatic regions. Currently the following four gr~mps are emerging: 
Star Alliance 
United  Airlines,  Lufthansa,  Air 
Canada, SAS, Thai Airways, Varig 
·Wi!Jgs and associates 
North  West  Ai~lines,  KLM, 
· Alitalia, Continental Airlines 
Oneworld and associates 
American  Airlines,  British·  Airways, 
Iberia,  Canadian  Airlines,  · Qantas, 
,Aerolineas Argentinas, Cathay Pacific 
Delta Swlssair group 
Delta  Airlines,  Swiss  Air, .Sabena, . 
Austrian Airlines, TAP Portugal; 
Current. alliances focus  essentially on the marketing side.  The various· code.:. share 
arrangements  are  a  way to  develop  networks without  actually  having to .  operate 
·  · · more  flights.  ·  Alliance  partners  establish  .  preferential  arrangements  to:, offer 
comprehensive. frequent  flier and  c~rpcirate discount programmes. They streamljne 
., ... schedules so as to facilitate connections betWeen· the: alliance partners  ari~L therefore· 
shorten travel time  . 
.  · Competition law 
·.:16. ·  -R.'e!)_trucJu~ng> which, take  the  form .either' of  a  merger .or. an··  aliiance, ··may· raise. 
problems of. compatibility with the .CoinmuQ~ty competition ·law,:requirin:g strong. 
enforcement of the  rules, -In  the  actual  appli~ation of competition  law  to  airline 
alliances the ·Commission has to bear ii) mind the need of the airlines to  adapt· to a 
new :·c:mvironment,  but also  the  need  to  preserve effective competition. on  all  the  . 
. :ml;lfket concerned. It is alSo necessary that the passengers obtain·.a fair share of the 
)·e~~lting' benefit  of the' alliances, .particularly:, .as  far  as fares  and .  services  are 
conc.equ!d.  The Commission strictly applies :the c_oin:petitiqn rilles to  the different 
areas ~(~he air transport sector. So during July 1998 it·made a draft proposat setting 
out :the  measures  (mainly  regarding the  disposal  of  slot~ . at  major  congested. 
European. airports)  which  needed  tQ ··be· (aken  in· order  to. put  an .·end  to  an 
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_infringement"  of.  the  competition  rules  m  the  BNAA  and  Lufthansa/UNSAS 
alliances5.-
Lack of an external dimension. 
-17.  "Liberalisation  has  addressed so  far  only air service  within  the  boundaries of the 
European  Unlori6.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  not  yet' freedom  to  provide  service 
· between  our Member States  and -countri~s outside Europe. Those -toutes  are  ~till 
_  regulated by the  traditional  system ·based  on  bilateral 'agreements.  Under  ~uch a 
_bilateral-agreement, air service between the two signatory countries can be operated 
· only _by  airlines  that  are  majority  owned  and  controlled  by  nationals _of_ thOse 
countries. Because in this system traffic rights are linked to nationality, changes in_ 
ownership nationality result in  loss of traffic lights and_ are therefore discouraged. 
Indeed, international equity investments between airlines have so far been generally 
quite  sxmbolic,  in  the  order  or' magnitude  of a, few- percent  of stock.  As  a 
consequence,  the  air  transport  industry,  ·unlike  o-ther  industries,  cannot ·pursue 
integration and scale-economies through the mergerand -take-over process. ln this 
CO? text alliances come up as a pa~ial and provisional answer.  -
A particularly negative consequence of  the bilateral system is that European -airlines 
normally cannot fly  to  non member countri_es  from  any point in the;EU but only 
frorri  the  territory of their home Member State.  This  creates an  asymmetry that · 
Clearly disadvantages European airlines in comparison with the.ir competitors. This 
.  is-particularly striking in the case of  the transatlantic market.-American carriers can 
fly from _whatever airport.ln the ·{JS  to a wide range of airports in ,fue."EU.  On the 
contrary  European carriers  can _operate  to  the  US -from only-one Member State  .. 
Actually-European carriers are still operating in a w;:1y  as  if American Airlines (or 
· any other American carrier) had traffic rights from Dallas butnot from New York or 
Chicago. This ·situation is made even worse by the pn~liferation of so call,ed_"open 
skies" agreements between the US  ~d  some EU countries7. Consequently European 
5 Other a;eas where the Commission·has applied competition law ar~ airport charges and ground handling. 
In -1996  the-Commission  took  a  negative  decision  concerning  discrimination  on  landing  fees  at 
Brussels airport in favour of Sabena. Negative decisions under Article 82 of the Treaty were adopted-
on a- case  regarding  Frankfu1t  Airport  (against  ~ ·prohibition  of self-handling)  and  on  a  case -of 
discriminatory fees applied to· the provision of ground .handling serVices at Paris-Orly and_Paris-CDG. 
airports. 
J  - - •  -
6 A Commission's proposal to extend general Community competence was tabled in 1992 but has met with · 
only partial success. A c<;>mmon Aviation Area has been created by ~xtending the scope of the third 
package to Norway and Iceland. An ·agreement with Switzerhuid has been recentJy negotiated, a·nd  a 
similar one is being negotiated with 10 countries of  East Europe. In 1996 the Com:nis3ion received a 
partial mandate to negotiate with the US. This  ~andate did not (and dots not) includ-=:  market access 
issues. 
7  Iri  the view· ~f the Commission,  ''open skies"  agreement~ constitute a major distortion of the  internal 
market  as  created  by  the  third  package  ·since  they  grant  5'h  freedom  traffic  rights  within  the 
Community to US airlines and discrii:ninate between Community carriers on grounds of nationality, 
thereby preventing the exercise of freedom: of establishment. Consequently the Commission started 
infringement  procedures  under .Art.  226  of the .Treaty  against  those- Member  States  that ·have 
concluded "Open skies" or similar agreements with the US. 
I  •  '  c  "-
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air carriers cannot effectively exploit their home EC  market of some 360 million 
potential passengers as a base for their transatlantic operations. 
Therefore  it  is  important to  complete the  single aviation market with. a  genuine 
external dimension. Common agreements 9etween :the European Union as  a whole 
and. third countries have.to be negotiate<}both at multilateral and bilateral level. The 
Commission will continue its efforts· to achieve the creation of a Common Aviatioil. 
A~ea with the uss. Furthermore· consideration must be  give~ to~ the position 'of air  . 
transport in the new' round ofnegotiations under the General Agreements·ofTrade'in ' 
Services (GATS) ofthe WTO, which will start in year 1999. 
The  Solution  to  this  regulatory  obstacle  lies· in .  the  completion  of a.  s~ngle  ai~. · 
transport  market  which  is  genuinely open  to  the ·outside.  Only  by  concluding 
agreements between the  European Community arid  third ·countries;  especially the  · 
United States; can European companies compete on an equal footingwith their. main 
. competitors. 
.  '.:' 
8 The Council has so far refused the Commission a full mandate to negotiate a CAA ~ith the US. 
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3. TEN YEARS OF LIBERALISATION 
18. · In th~ hist  10 years the European air transport industry has undergone a proce~s in 
several stages oftransition from tight regulation, based on bilateral agreements and 
. · duopoly  ~vith virtually no ~ompetition, towards a single market. This resulted in the 
. ·reduction of  the discretionary powers of  national authorities and the extension of  the · 
possibilities  for air  carriers ·to  decide,  on  the  basis  of economic  and· financial 
·considerations, fares,  new routes and capacities to  be offered on the market.  As  a 
result  air .  transport  within . the  :European  Economic  Area  is ·now  governed  by 
common rules. which provide for licensing, market access, pricing freedom and  the 
application of  the competition rules. 
General experience-up to  date . 
1  9.  The  Commission  assessed  these  developments  in  199.69,  noting  that  the . 
liberalisation  process has  mutated the economic environment for  air transport 'by 
m;1king  it  an  increasingly  competitive market.  The· first  3  years  of liberalisation 
. resulted  in. gradually growing  competition,  in  particular  the· number  of carriers 
·considerably. increased.  Liheralisation  has .  brought  clear  benefits  to:  consume~s; 
·However,  some shortcoming·s  might  weaken  the  liberalisation  process'  ability  to 
. deliver to  the  consumer better services· at' lower cost.  The  report  highlighted· the 
problem  of capacity restrictions 'and  high  costs  for  infrastructure  as  well  as :the 
contradictory and unsatisfactory trend concerning fares.  'While  pro~otional fares 
have become more widespread, the  prices of fully  flexible  fares· have-.  increased. 
There  .  are  still • large  differences  iri  fares  .per  KM  across  Europe.  Recent 
developments after 1996 confirm the trend and are outlined in annexl. ' .. 
Whilst the increasingly competitive environment has brought benefits to consumers,. 
some of the  responses by  the  ~i~lines to  this  environment could  undermine  these _  · 
benefits  ..  The. proliferation of tariffs, over-booking, the availability. of seats at the 
. most  publicised  promotion. fare,.  the·  growth  in  FFP's, ·code-sharing  and  airline 
alliances- can all make  it  harder for  consumers to  compare competing offers.  As 
competition  increases,  market  transparency  needs  to  be  assured,  if consumer 
confidence ·is  to be maintained. ' A competitive and efficient air transport market 
- .  depends  as  much  on  well-informed  consumers,  in. a  position  to  make  rational 
· choices,  ·a.s  efficient  providers.  The  recent  initiatives  on  denied  boarding  a.'ld 
computerised reservation systems have gone some· way to address these issues.  The · 
Commission has also commissioned a study to examine the information· passengers 
n~ed  to make-rationaLchoices. 
20.  In tern:ls of the regulatory  fr~ework, the Commission has noticed-that, despite the· 
provisions laid down in the third package, there are areas where Membu· States still 
tend to have differentiated practices, ..vhich can impede the proper functionitig of  the 
single market.  · 
9 ·  COM(96) 514 final of 22 October 1996, Impact of the Third Package of Air Transport Liberalisation . 
Measures. 
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In the case of public service obligations, article 4 of Regulation 2408/92 provides 
that  under  particular  circumstances  the  free  access  to  traffic  rights  within  the 
Community can be limited on the  grounds of public  interest.  However,  different. 
ways of dealing with public service obligations in the Member States .may  lead  to 
some domestic markets being less open and liberalised than others. 
Leasing of aircraft registered outside the Community is  another area of concern. 
Leases are regulated by article 8 of Regulation 2407/92 OJ! licensing of air carriers, 
which  requires  that aircraft  used  by an  air.carrier. must be registered  within  the 
· Community.  Howev~r, in  order to  meet  temporary  reeds"of
1 the  air  carrier  or 
otherwise in. exceptional circumstances; a Member State may· authorise short time . 
leases of aircraft registered in non-EU countries. The Commission has noticed that·. 
· Member States follow different practices  fo~ the implementation of this provision. 
Since  non-EU  countries  usually  adopt  less  stringent· rules  for· the  liceiJ,sing  of 
aircraft,  different  practices  in  this . area  result  in · .very  different  liability~ 
environmental  and  safety  standards  across  the. Community.  In. this. light  the 
Commission,' .  in  CO"Operatio'n  with  the'  memt?er  States,  contemplates.  for  the 
.preparation of guidelines to clarify its interpretatio.n o(  the pro·vision on short term 
'  leases ofnon-Eu aircraft.  · ·  ·  .·1. 
·:  . 
'  '  .. 
i 1  ...  A,s  a follow.:up  to the 1996  ~ominunication, the· Commission is now investigating 
. the. ·r.egulatory  and commercial barriers  :tha:t  restrain the complete development of 
.cqmpetition in the aviation single market 
For  this  purpose  it  carried .out  a. study·: on· the  impact qf regulation  and  certain· 
· co:riJmercial practices on the developiTlent'ofcompetition in the air transport market. 
The. study-identifies and analyses ·factors inhibiting the groWth of  small andmedi1.1m 
sized. airlines 'following liberalisation ·  w:ith ·a· view to developing policy optiqns for: 
removing or  reducing barriers to competition. In this context a number of  srriall and 
medium sized airlines have been irite..Viewed and asked. to  a8sess the liberalisation 
pr:oces.s  and its. shortcomings.  The study· fou~d that there is an overall consensus 
that. the· present regulatory regime· is working well. However,. the following matters 
. emerge~.  as:'ardis of  con.ceip·. in order  ~ofpriori,ty:. .  .  '  .  . 
.•:  . 
·,  ' ' 
- Access  to  slots/airport capacity problems.  This  seems  to  be the  single. m'ost 
important barrier, especially for airlines seeking to compete "head-to-head" wi'th 
·.  the flag carriers. Barriers arise from the functioning of the slot pool arid the ·~Jot 
allocation·.  inechariism.  The  pool, .. created  by  Coltlii1unity  legislatio~.Io,. js 
. '  considered too small and cannot be expected to generate suffiCient slots to enable 
·  a -new  e,-ttr~t t~  ·compete against the.· established incumb<::;nts .. Things. are  ~ade 
· . : evep .worse by· incumbents' ability to in4irectly control additional slots. through· 
franchisees or alliance partners. Moreover small and medium sized airlin<::;s  feel 
that slot co-ordinators, who are frequently former. employees of flag carriers, are 
biased in slot allocation. 
- Loyalty.  schemes:  they  comprise  both  frequent  flyer  programmes  (FFPs)  and 
.  co!por:ate  discounts, but the majority. of airlines'  concerns relate to FFPs.  The 
10 Regulation 95/93/EC 
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effectiveness  of FFPs  stems  from  the  asymmetry  between· the  interest  of the 
corporate traveller, who enjoys the FFP benefits, and the employer, who pays for 
the ticket. The key barriers reside in the fact t11at FFPs favour airlines with  large 
· networks,  which  offer  travellers  greater  chances to accumulate  and  use  FFPs 
points.  In  contrast there is  little scope .for small and  me-dium  ~arriers to  op~ratc 
such schemes, because their networks are too small to make them attractive. For 
these types of airline  the  administrative ·costs  and  the  costs  ~n lost  revenue of· 
,  ~,flying  frequent  flyers  for  free  and _therefore  losing the potential  revenue  from 
their  seats -are  high ·compared  to  the  expected  commercial  advantage.  As  a· 
consequence  only  larger  airlines  are  able  to  exploit FFPs,  by  attracting  more 
traffic and sustaining higher fares. 
Differences  in regulatory  enviro-nment:  several  of the  interviewed  airlines  are . 
concerned :about  the  attitude  of national  authorities  in  some  Member  States 
towards  e_merging  competition,  iri .  particular  in  the  areas  of slot  allocation, 
negotiation of bilateral agreements covering access to non EU  markets, award of 
Public Service Obligation (PSO) contracts and other special· situations requiring. 
ad hoc decisions. 
\  . 
-. Qround· handling charges and  quality  .. Most of the  airlines complain <!bout  the 
high.·cost and low quality of  ground handling serviCes. They fear that the ground 
.  -handling  liberalisatio~ directive may not be sufficient to foster competition in the 
·  .·  .  se~tor, since it includes too many safeguards, does not ensure· enough competitors 
,_  :,.; .. -·and dO<:)S not apply to airports with.-Jess than two million passengers:·  "-:  ·' ;_  · . 
·, 
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ANNEX 1 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE. FULL LIBERALISATUON. 
A initial view of the impact of liberalisation is given by the trend in the number of 
carriers within the European marKet.  Indeed the number of scheduled carriers has 
grown  ~teadily between 1992 and today (figur~ 1),  showing that more carriers are 
now active·, providing more services. Data on entry and exit of  carriers in the market 
place (figure 2)pinpoints the dynamic and competitive nature of  air transport.  · 
Figure 1 
1EO 
16J 
140 
12l 
100 
00 
a:i 
'10 
2l 
0 
Figure 2 
3) 
.25 
2J 
15 
.1Q 
5 
0 
-- ···----·--------------····--···------.  -;--·-'-----·  ---------~-1 
.  l'knber d scheciHd  CXliT1I1Uily carrierS  · · 
.  .may  eed1y£fr (scure:~  .  . .  .  . 
1003 
1003 
.  ' 
.  1004  1006  1007 
l 
............  ····- ··--··-·····. ·-----···. -· ·------------ ~-
llll tdal sc:tm..ia:l cirBs  11 perl'!"B"ID C3Tias 1003-1006  . 
-----~-----------~-----------
Btry  ~exit  of aniers  ' 
.may  EBd1 yeg" (s::uce: fmiQIG) 
22, 
I 
I_ 
::  ·,. 
1003 
---·  ,•' 
The development of competition a~ route level 
The impact ofliberalisation can also be seen in the evolution in the number of routes 
between  Member States  within  the  Union  since  1992- (crossborder,  or intra-EU, 
routes, figure 3) 
Figure 3 
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Evolution of airfares· 
I 
The Commission Report of 1996 pointed out that, even though anihcreasingly large 
n~Jmber of promotional  fares  became  available,  which  increased  .. the  range  of 
attractive airfares  available to  users,  flexible  fares  kept  on increasing.  It clearly 
appears that these fares are narrowly correlated to distance but also to the degree of 
competition by single route, as the following tables show.  ., 
Figure 4 
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This first  table (average. of the fares  on all Community routes, values expressed in 
EURO on January  1997)  shows that  competition  has  a  real  impact On  the  price 
travellers 'pay .for air transport. In particular: 
the level of fares  decreases when the market structure passes from  monopoly II 
towards duopoly or routes with more than two  carriers.  Consumers eDjoy  fare 
redt!ctionsin a range Of 10% to 24%, depending on the type of  fare; 
fully  flexible  b~siness and economy fares  arft in the same order of magnitude, 
while promotional fares are half as high. 
·Figures 5 and 6 compare fares on some major routes, namely average fares from 20 
.  capi~als and main hubs.  It  is· clear from  figure 6 that fares per Km depend on_ the· 
distance .flown.  However,. even taking into  considerat~on distance,  there  are large 
differences across the European Union. In particular fares  are ,higher from  airports 
such as Vienna-,  Frankfurt, Paris .COG, Brussels, Copenhagen and Stockholm. There 
.. may be several factors explaining this situation, such as local cost levels,,the degree 
.·.of competition,  congestion  arid ·local  market  conditions.  Where  appropriate  the 
Commission will examinethese factors in more detail. 
. Figure 5 
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- 11  Monopoly at route level should not necessarily be interpreted as a failure of liberalisation. It may : 
. well be that on some newly operated routes the volume of  traffic is too thin to support more than one 
. . carrier.  Still  liberalisation  ~s successful,  in. that  it  allows  airlines  to  create  new· markets  for  air 
transport  .. 
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ANNEXZ 
.  SOCIAL IMPACT OF CURRENT TRENDS 
e  Development of  employment 
.  . 
Following the restructuring measures adopted by airlines, between  1988-1996 /the 
overall number of employees in  civil  aviation increased from  435,400. to  489,700 
arid the outlook for employment in this sector remains positive  . 
. . Air traffic (AEA statistics) and total number of  jobs in the civil aviation sector giew 
at  a different pace over three distinct subperiods. They. both inc·reased considerably 
'before .liberalisation and  the  world ec.onomic  recession ofthe ·early  19908.  Then, 
• . . .. . . .  when most airlines  undertook  in-depth ·restructuring,  traffic growth  slowed down 
while · employment  decreased.  Eventually,  when  restructuring  st.arted  working, 
growth resumed.  . 
'  .. 1988-90-= 
•  <'.  1990-94·  1994-96  .. 
-
Traffic growth .. ,  ··  8%- 5.9%  7.9% 
-
Employment growth  6.1%  -1.9%  1.8% 
' 
· The following table shows in more .detail the evolution of  employment.  ~ 
· Employment ('000) ·  1988  1989.  1990  .1991  1992  1993.  . 1994  1995  1996 
Airlines·  324.9  351.4  365.9  357.1  351.1  .  342.0  '338.2.  345.2  350.5 
Airports  79.1  83.4  88.5  89.0  .  . 89.5  88.3  88.0  88.2  89.2 
Ground handling  7.3  7.8  8.5  8.8  9.3  9.7  10.2  11.7  .  13.0; 
Catering  24.1  25.5  28.4  30.0  32.3  32.0  34.0•  36.3  37.0 
· .. Total  435.4  468.1  491.3  484.9  482.2  472.0  '470.4  481.4  489.7 
26 The  overall  trend  in  employment  has  not  been  reflected  consistently  across  EU 
member states. 
· - ------.-9-s~8--t9-=-9c-:o------r-----=-t9=-=9=-=o~-t=-=9-=-94-=------.---'----:-:19::-::9:-:-4-=-1-:::-9:::-96~.---, 
.  (' 
All  countries  ·hut  one  More  positive ·and. _negative 
-trel)ds  were  ' evident.  Only 
Germany,  Austria  (+3.6%), 
and  Luxembourg  (+1.4%) 
experienced  annual  growth, 
while  employment decreased 
in  all  other  countries,  down 
by ·-3.1% in  Belgimn  and·~ 
4.2% in Italy 
.The  annual . · growth  was 
once  agam  evident  m  (Greece,  with  -0.7%) 
experienced.  annual 
growth . · in  .  •  employment 
rangmg.  from  _ -+3.5% 
(Spain)  and +3.8%  (Italy) 
to +9 .0% (Germany) 
countries'  'from  F:rance 
·., 
(+ 1.0%)  to  Finl~d 
(+6·.7%), apart from  Italy(~ 
1.3%),  Portugal- (-4.7%) 
and Greece· (-11.5%): 
.. 
... \ 
In  1996,  more than halfof the total johs)n tne civil  !lviation,secto~ (55%(were 
. concentrated in three countries; i.e. the Uni'ted Kingdom (19.8%), Germapy '(19.5%) 
and  F~ance  (15.7%).  .  .·  .  · ·  .. · ·.·  ·  .  .  .  ··  · ·  ··.  .,  . 
.(  - .. · 
h1  i  996,  airlines  represented lhe, maj9'r  component  of the: sector's  employmen~ . 
(72%), followed by airports (18%), airli'ne_caterers (7%) and ground handlers'(3%) .. 
· The rate of growth in employment has stagnated from  1988 to ·1996 for flag cairiers 
(+0.04%) .w_hile  it.increased  for  'other  airlines  (+4.6%).  Major airlines  generally 
. decided to focus on core business since 1990, creating subs.idiaries or subcontracting 
· . parts -of  their activity to smaller aitlines and also to ground handling and catering 
companies.  In additiori,  several new niche carriers emerged and,  like the  smaller 
airlines, these have enjoyed groWth in their own networks. .  .  .  '  ' 
Overall annual rate of  growth of  employment (1988-1996) 
'  '  •  I  .  .  . 
Flag carriers  Other airlines  Airports  Gro~nd  handling  Catering 
. ' 
+0.04%  +4.6%  +1.5%.  +7.4%  +5.5% 
Employment is expected to grow- slightly for airlines in the UK; .Austria and Finland 
but remain stable for airlines in the other EU member states. 
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0  Social effects 
one or  the  mai~ rcatu~es of the period underreview is- the spreading· of  new forms or 
employment aimed at increasing flexibility. This applied particularly to state-owned 
airlines  which  accounted  for  67%  of all  airline  employment in 1988  (apart from 
.British  Airways, ·which -was  already .privatised).  Conditions of employment  have 
been  modified,  particularly  for  newly  hired  employees.  Many of them  are  now 
·granted fixed term contracts and,  in many cases,  a two-ti~r pay system is·  applied. 
Pcrf~rmance related  pay_ schemes tend to. replace  seniori~y pay schemes for some 
categories of  employees.·· 
· It must be stressed that this trend is not specific to the air transport industry and can 
--be  observed  in  other sectors  of·activity where  a ·liberalisati_on  process  has  been 
initiated or. where competition is having a significant impact.  However for  longer 
service employe¢s job security remains relatively goo~ at flag carri_ers. Furthermore, 
the.level of wages is  still  higher (from  15% to ·25%  in  most cases) there than at 
smaller airlines for _similar jobs  .. 
The ·most notable· change observed in ground handling and catering is the emergence 
of  the practice of  subcontracting the main base activities by major. airlines as well as· 
its  extensive  use·  by  smaller. airlines,. especially  new· entrant  low-cost airlines. 
Although  some  attempts·  have  been  made~ by-..Europeari  ..  airlines  to  ·outsource 
activities to low-cost economiesjn Asia, this practice· remains ,limited  .. _ 
'J' 
.  .'  ·: 
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ANNEX3 
.  . 
OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESTRUCTURING OPERATIONS 
The Commissi_on's approach to public financing of airlines 
The European ·approach to air transport liberalisation acknowledges that interests, in 
addition .to  those of air carriers,  are at  stake  and  m;ed  to  be accommodated:  air 
· t.rarisport  users,. employees  (in  safeguarding  and  creating  jobs  and. working . 
conditions),  national  authorities  (in  the  role. of air· carriers  as  public  service 
providers)  as  well  as  environmental ·and safety  issues.  In  order to  balance. these 
interests,  liberalis;:ttion  was  phased  in  gradually,  along  with  s'afegu~ds.  This . · 
acknowledges· that the market alone  may not always  be able  to  serve  all· policy . 
objectives (public service, eiwironment).  Cont~olling state aid for restructuring the 
European air.transport industry fits into this framework. The Co.mm.issjon's policy 
· in this area aimed at .striking· a balance betw-een the need to. protect the. sin,gle ·market' 
from  the distortive effect of subsidies on the one himd, with the useful role·· aid· can 
.  play in_restructuring the .industry, if  granted under strict andclear.conditi~ns, 9nth~ 
other hand. The Commission aimed at creating a level'playing field for competition, 
while  accept1~g that. so.me  airiines carrying ·.th~ financial  burden of the· p3$t  must 
. have  the  chance  for  a  fresh  start wi,t,hin. the . framework  of a. reorganisation 
programme, provided that this d~es not advers~ly affect the situation of  competitors. 
- .  '  .  '  .  .  .  . 
The guidelines and the mar~et  economy investorprindple 
In  1994 the Commission set out principles ·and  criteria for the assessment of state 
aid to  airlines in the guidelines· on the application of articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty (Ex articles 92 and 93 of  the Treaty) and article 61  of  the EEA agreement to 
· . state aid in the aviation sector. 
·  The  guidelines  require  first  of all  a  preliminary: assessment  as  to· whether  the . 
.  provision· of capital, loans or guarantee by_ public· institutions to  an  airline is  to  be 
considered aid or a normal commercial transaction; The basis for' this assessment is 
th~' so~called market economy investor prindple (MEIP): .under the MEIP a capital 
IFmsact:ion  may  be  regarded· as  state .aid  if an  investor,  operating  under  ~ormal 
niarket- . economy  conditions, · woulq  not  be  p.repared  to.  make  an· equivalent 
investment in the airline. 
The Market Economy Investor ,?rinciple 
.  . 
There are two  stage~ in the Commission's assessment of  a State aid case. First if has 
to  determine ·whether  aid  is  involved, .·by  evaluating  the  circumstances  of the 
financial  transaction:  the MEIP is the tool for assessing whether the. measure is  a 
-normaJ  commercial  transaction or aid.  In  a  second "stage,  if' the-'  Commission 
considers  the  transaction  to  have aid  elements,  it  determines  :whether  the  aid  is 
compatible with the common market. According to Jhe guidelines a market economy 
investor would normally provide equity finance if. the expectations of the present 
value of future  cash flows (discounted at .the  company's marginal cost of capital) 
accruing  via  dividen~ payments andlor capital gains, and adjusted  for  risk,  exceed 
. 
' 
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1 the new outlity. ·The application of the MEIP test requires the  Cortu~1ission; assisted· 
by its  financial advisers, to estimate parameters such as the expected growth rate of 
future  cash flow, the marginal cost of capital for  the airline,  the  "hurdle" rate  of 
return, below· which the- private sector ~ould not be willing to invest in.the project. 
These estimates rely on the forecasts of  the business ·plan, whose robustness  and J 
credibility  are .assessed  on  the  basis  of·  the  airline's  financial  performance,  the 
cco_nomlc and  technic~! efficiency and the· comrrierciaJ-strategy.  · 
If the assessment under the MEIP leads to the conclusion that aid is involved, than 
. the Commission  -~ssesses whether the~  aid may be considered as compatible with the 
_  common market: According to Article 87(1 ):of the Treaty, State aid which  distort~ 
comp_etition  an4  affects. tnide  between  member  States  is  incompatible  with  the 
common market. However exemptions are possible; in particuhir under art 87(3)(c) 
. aid' may be  considered  compatible with the  common  market if it  .facilitates  the 
development  of dertain · economic  activities'- Without- adv~rsely affecting  trading 
c;onqitions to an. extent contrary to the common interest. This provisi~n enables the 
Commission to approve restructuring aid;. but also requires it to set· out appropriate 
cond~tions the -recipient -arid  the donor have to  meet: so that the possible -adverse 
·effect of  aid on competition is limited or l'revented.  · 
-The guidelines set out the following·conditions:  .  . 
·-:·: ... aid-mus.t forrn part ofa comprehensive restructuring programme and be oflimitcd · 
.  duration .. H must .be .approved by the. Commission· and  aims -at  .restoring  the 
airline's health,.-so that it cah·, within a reason_able period, be expected to operate 
_without further aid;  ·  . 
the prografl1me must be self-contained, _meaning  that no further aid is necessary 
·- for the duration of the  .. programme or is  envisaged in the future-: Aid should be 
_granted only once;  . 
·  ~.:capacity reductions must be included in the programme, if  restoration to. financial 
.  and coriunetcial viability so requires;.  ·  · 
the programme inust noCbe expansive, -in  the sense that it must not lead to an 
, increase  in the number of aircraft  ~d  offered  seats.  This  condition is  of the 
.·  I.  '  ' 
- .. utmost importance to make sure that the difficulties of the_ airline receiving the 
·aid are not transferred to its co~petitors;  ' 
- ·-the  Government must not interfere. in·-the  management of the company,. which 
rriust be run according to ·commercial principles.·  · 
. The Commission  ·usually seeks ,the advice of  independent experts for the assessment 
of _the  plan. The .  findings  of this  assessment  eventually lead. the Commission to 
decide-under what conditions the MS is authorised to·grant the aid-to the airline, ifat 
alL  However· the  decision· does" not  mark .the  end of the  procedure,  since  the 
implementation of the restructuring plan must be carefully monitored.  Indeed the 
·commission. has  to ·check that  the  commitments ·and  conditions  set out  in  the.  · 
decision .are  fulfilled.  For this  purpose  progress:- reports  are  to  be submitted· for: 
· evalu~tion and·approval of  the Commission: if,aid is- paid in instalments, p~yment  of 
30 
.. . the next instalment is conditional on approvai Q(the progress report.  Even  for  the 
assessment of the_ progress reports the Commission may, and  usually does, usc the 
assistance of  external consultants  .. 
Of course each case has its own facts, however, when an~lys~ng the situation ofthe 
. crisis and its causes as well as the restructuring plans and the effects of the aid, it is 
possible to identify sorrie basic elements corrimon to all the reforrnin{airline~~ The 
consideration of aid in comparison with turnover allows a first; rol,lgh appreciation 
of  the order of  magnitude· of  the aid measures.· Figure 712 ·shows for each airline the 
year when the aid was granted and authonsed by the Conirnission,.th.eamount of  the 
aid  and the  tum over the. year before:  Aid is· in  a  range of ·30%  t~  .. 35% of the .  · 
tuiTlover as regards Iberia, Aer Lingus, Air France ap.dAlitalia; whik!t  ·is  farb;gg~r 
·-- for Tap (slightly higher than. the turnover) Sabeha (50%· higher than the t9mover) 
and Qlympic Airways (more than double the turnover)  .  .'  ·'  · ·  ·  · · 
.  Figure _7  ,.,' 
: . .  -
.---------------.;..._"'--;-----'-:------'----'-~-'--'-,--:--~  ... · 
State 8'd. and tUrn over, @ M 
'  •  J'.  • 
IBERIA  AERUNGUS, TAP  .:  AIR FRANCE  OLYMPIC'ALITAI:JA 
(91)  .  (93)  ..  (94-97)  .·.  .'(9~96)  . (94-97)  ..  (97~98): 
I:·•AID 'I  TURN OVER  I 
. ··.  :·.· ..  ,-
12  The Commission assessed the performance of the  seven airlines that received :State aid on  the 
. basis·of a number of financial, productivity and operating indicators. All figures.are Commission's 
· elaboration on data provided in the airlines' official annual reports.  · 
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The' scale of the  crisis experienced by these airlines before receiving restructuring 
aid,  is:  evident  when  considering  their.  eCUTIO!fllC  performances,  which  are 
characterised. by a mark.:;d  and prolonged lack of profitability coupled with  high 
levels  of debt.  Operating results  are  negative,  as  suggested  by the  values of the 
operating ratios (sec below  figure  9),  while net results. are even worse since they 
rellect the huge interest costs gener?ted by debt. bebtin .turri usually records a sharp 
increase in the few years preceding the recapitalisation: it is common opinion that in· 
the. air transport industry a  normal, healthy value for the gearing ratio. (long term 
debt/equity) is around 1  .5  to 2, the assisted airlines reach levels in a range of  6 to 17 
while there are som~  cases ofnegat~ve  ow~ers' equity. (figure 8).  . 
Figure 8 *. 
GEARIN-G (medium & ·long term debt! shareholders' funds) 
j :  ~. 
S::1bena  Aer Lingus  Iberia  Air France  .  T.A.P  Alital~a  Olympic  British  · 
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*.In CC:JSe of negati,;e equit~· value the rat.io is meaningless and is conv~ntionally assumed to be ~1. As one would 
· exp\'yt, the rat.ios sharply improve in the'ye'ars after the recapitalisation.'  .  .  .  .  .  ·  ,  · 
.Th\s  commercial and fina..11cial  weakness has its  origin in the high cost and  low 
productivity stmctme combined with the decreasing load factors and  yie]qs which 
affected  the  industry  in  the  difficult  early  1990s  .. In .this ·situation  the  revenue 
. generated by the operation of  aircraft was not sufficient to cover the operating costs, 
leading  therefore  to  negative  operating. results. · The  operating  results  were  then 
worsened  by  the  interest· expenses  brought  by  the  growing  debt.  Debt  was . 
determined by the cumulation of  losses in· several years in a row and by the financial 
burden generated by the Ia~ge purchase of  new aircraft which occurred at the end of 
the 1980s.- · 
Sev·eral factors may  cxplaii:r this high cost - low productivity, Indeed the recipient 
airlines have been characterised by an. excessive number of employees·compared to 
· capaciiy,  resulting  in  very  low  productivity,  measured  in  terms  of output  per 
employee  (A TK/employee  indicator).  This  circumstance; coupled  with  the  high 
level  in labour costs, is  the main explarmtion for the operating costs being. far  in 
excess of the  t~:<vel  attained by healthy and profitable airlines. A  factor frequently 
32 recurring is the inefficient fleet mix. The presence of  many different types of aircraft 
involves  higher  costs  for  maintenance  and  repair,  and  staff training  and  skill 
requirement:  this also results in  higher operating costs.  Further problems were the 
·presence of  loss-making non core activities, poor product p!anning which resulted in 
too widespread networks including not profitable routes and corporate culture being 
scarcely open to flexibility and innovation. 
Results 
The  restructming programmes have achieved  their  objec~ives 'to  an  extent which 
varies from an airline to another but that on average ca.'l be regarded as satisfactory. 
This is  brought out by the financial and commercial perfonnances assessed on the 
basis of  a number of financial, productivity, and operating ratios: in  1.995  and  1996 
the airlines  which received aid· were .able to  achieve satisfactory and  encouraging 
levels  of viability.  A  glance at  some  basic  Indicators  can  highlight  this  positive 
evolution: One of  the most used indicators in the industry is the operating ratio, that 
is the ratio between revenue and costs rciated to the_principal activities, regardless of 
finanCial and -exceptional elements. 
Figure 9 
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Figure 9 shows that there is a· positive·  evolution in the operating ratios for all the 
state  aid  recipients,  with .the  exception of Olympic  Airways,  although the  tren<f: 
needs to be consolidated and strengthened when compared to British Airways, here 
.taken  as ·a  benchmark. Important improvements  were  also  achieved  in  terms  of. 
productivity.  Figures  10  and  11  show the evolution of two  classicaJ productivity 
indicators.  The  first,  ATK/Staff,  is  the  ratio  between  the  capacity,  or pQtential 
output, expressed as available tonne kilometres, and the number of employees. One 
can observe two groups of airlines with different level of productivity, but all  the 
companies succeed in increasing the output per employee. 
33 
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The evolution_ of  the operating costs per unjt of output, depicted in  figure 11, is to 
he interpreted ·with some caution,-because of  the influence of  stage length. S~nce  the 
average cost per kilometrefor short fligrts is higher than for long haul and airlines 
have  networks  of  different  average  length,  the  comparisc;m  is  not . fully 
homogeneous. However even this indicator shows a general trend towards increased 
'  -
productivity. 
Figure 11 
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